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In this paper, we first provide a brief exposition of the simplest version of the selfish life 
cycle model or hypothesis, which is undoubtedly the most widely used theoretical model 
of household behavior in economics, and then survey the literature on household saving 
behavior in Japan (with emphasis on the author’s own past research) to shed light on 
whether or not the selfish life-cycle model applies in the case of Japan. In particular, we 
survey the literature on the impact of the age structure of the population on the saving 
rate, the saving behavior of retired households, saving motives, the prevalence of 
bequests, bequest motives, tests of altruism, and the importance of borrowing (liquidity) 
constraints and show that almost all of the available evidence suggests that the selfish 
life-cycle model applies to a greater extent in Japan than it does in other countries. 
Finally, we discuss the policy implications of our findings. 
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The selfish life-cycle model or hypothesis is undoubtedly the most widely used 
theoretical model of household behavior in economics. Many researchers have 
investigated whether or not this model applies in the case of Western economies, and the 
broad consensus is that it does (see, for example, Modigliani (1975), Deaton (1992, 
2005), Hayashi (1997b), and Attanasio (1999), and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2017)), but 
whether or not it applies in Japan and other non-Western economies with very different 
traditions, social norms, and institutions and closer family ties is another question. The 
purpose of this paper is to survey the literature on household saving behavior in Japan 
(with emphasis on the author’s own past research) to shed light on whether or not the 
selfish life-cycle model applies in the case of Japan. There have been many 
comprehensive surveys of the literature on household saving and consumption behavior 
in Japan (for example, Hayashi (1986, 1997a), Horioka (1984, 1990, 1993, 2008a), and 
Ogawa and Horioka (1996)), but this paper is unique in that it focuses on the question 
of whether or not the selfish life-cycle model applies in the case of Japan.  
 
To preview the main findings of this paper, virtually all of available evidence suggests 
that the selfish life-cycle model applies to a greater extent in Japan than in other 
countries. Thus, the answer to the question posed in the title of this paper is an 
unqualified “yes.” 
 
This paper is organized as follows: I provide a brief exposition of the simplest version 
of the selfish life-cycle model in section 2; I survey the literature on the impact of the 
age structure of the population on the saving rate in section 3, that on the saving behavior 
of the retired elderly in section 4, that on saving motives in section 5, that on the 
prevalence of bequests in section 6, that on bequest motives in section 7, that on tests of 
altruism in section 8, and that on the importance of borrowing constraints in section 9; 
and I summarize my findings and discuss the policy implications thereof in section 10. 
 
 
2. The Selfish Life-Cycle Model 
 
In this section, we provide a brief exposition of the simplest version of the selfish life-
cycle model, which is primarily attributable to Franco Modigliani and his collaborators  
for more details, see Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Modigliani (1966)). In order 
to simplify the model as much as possible, we ignore the childhood years and assume 
that individuals graduate from school and start working at age 0 and that they work from 
age 0 until age R, earning Y yen each year, part of which they use to finance their current 
consumption and part of which they save in preparation for their retirement years. We 
further assume that individuals retire at age R, that they finance their living expenses 
during retirement by drawing down their previously accumulated savings, and that they 
die with certainty at age L. Finally, we assume that individuals smooth their consumption 
throughout their lives, consuming C yen per year from age 0 until age L, and that they 
are selfish, receiving no bequests or inter vivos transfers from their parents and leaving 




If we assume that the interest rate is zero, these assumptions imply that lifetime income 
will be Y*R and that lifetime consumption will be C*L. Thus, the lifetime budget 
constraint can be expressed as follows: 
  
(1)     Y*R = C*L  
 
If equation (1) is solved for C, we can obtain the following expression for C, which 
denotes the annual amount of consumption:  
 
(2)     C = (R/L)*Y 
 
In words, consumption will be a constant fraction of income, with that fraction being 
equal to the ratio of one’s working years to total lifespan. 
 
SW, the annual saving of working individuals can be calculated by subtracting 
consumption C from income Y and substituting the expression in equation (2) for C: 
 
(3)     SW = Y – C = (1 – R/L)*Y = ((L – R)/L)*Y 
 
In words, the saving of working individuals will be a constant fraction of their income, 
with that fraction being equal to the ratio of their retirement span to total lifespan.  
 
Moreover, since individuals are assumed to work for R years, CSW, the cumulative 
saving of working individuals, is as follows: 
 
(4)     CSW = R*((L – R)/L)*Y = (L – R)*(R/L)*Y 
 
As for retired individuals, since they have no income but need to consume, their 
consumption will be financed entirely by drawing down their previously accumulated 
saving. Thus, SR, the annual (dis)saving of retired individuals, is as follows: 
 
(5)     SR = – C = – (R/L)*Y 
 
Moreover, since the retirement span of retired individuals is (L – R) years, CSR, the 
cumulative (dis)saving of retired individuals, is as follows: 
 
(6)     CSR = – (L – R)*(R/L)*Y  
 
As can be seen by comparing equations (4) and (6), the cumulative saving of working 
individuals and the cumulative (dis)saving of retired individuals are precisely equal to 
one another in absolute magnitude but have opposite signs. This confirms that the 
lifetime budget constraint of individuals is satisfied. This is the same as saying that the 
area of the rectangle showing the cumulative saving of individuals during their working 
years is exactly equal to the area of the rectangle showing the cumulative (dis)saving of 




Next, I wish to derive the saving amount and saving rate of the household sector as a 
whole. From equations (3) and (5), AS, the aggregate saving of the household sector as 
a whole, is as follows: 
 
(7)     AS = POP(0, R)*((L – R)/L)*Y – POP(R, L)*(R/L)*Y, 
 
where POP(0, R) = the population aged 0 to R (the working-age population) 
  POP(R, L) = the population aged R to L (the retirement-age population) 
  
Furthermore, AY, the aggregate income of the household sector as a whole, is as follows: 
 
(8)    AY = POP(0, R)*Y 
 
Thus, ASY, the saving rate of the household sector as a whole, is as follows: 
 
(9)    ASY = AS/AY = (L – R)/L – [POP(R, L)/POP(0, R)]*(R/L) 
 
In other words, the saving rate of the household sector as a whole should be a function 
of the ratio of the retirement-age population to the working-age population, and the 
higher is this ratio, the lower should be the household saving rate. Moreover, the 
derivative of the household saving rate with respect to this ratio should equal the 
negative of the ratio of one’s working years to total lifespan.  
 
Thus, we can test whether the selfish life-cycle model applies by examining whether or 
not the age structure of the population (in particular, the ratio of the retirement-age 
population to the working-age population) has the expected impact on the household 
saving rate.  
 
Thus far, we have simplified our theoretical model by making the following 
assumptions: 
 
(1) There is no economic growth. 
(2) There is no public old-age pension system. 
(3) There is no lifespan uncertainty. 
 
The age structure of the population will have an impact on the household saving rate 
even if these simplifying assumptions are relaxed, but what will change is that now other 
factors will also affect the household saving rate.  
 
(1) If the economy is growing, cohorts born later will have higher lifetime 
incomes than cohorts born earlier, and thus the aggregate saving of cohorts 
that are working and saving will exceed the aggregate (dis)saving of cohorts 
that are retired and dissaving. As a result, if the economy is growing, the 
aggregate saving of the household sector as a whole will be positive, and the 
higher is the economic growth rate, the greater will be the aggregate saving of 




(2) If a public old-age pension system is introduced, there will be less need to save 
in preparation for one’s retirement years, and thus one would expect the saving 
of working-age individuals and the (dis)saving of retired individuals to be less 
than in a world with no public old-age pension system (see Feldstein (1974)).  
 
(3) If lifespan is uncertain and individuals are risk-averse, one would expect the 
saving of working-age individuals to be greater and the dissaving of 
retirement-age individuals to be less than in a world with no lifespan 
uncertainty because individuals will be afraid of running out of money before 
they die (see Davies (1981)). This will lead individuals to leave unintended or 
accidental bequests unless they are able to completely annuitize their wealth. 
 
 
3. Evidence on the Impact of the Age Structure of the Population on the Saving 
Rate 
  
We showed in the previous section that, if the selfish life-cycle model applies, the 
household saving rate should be a decreasing function of the ratio of the retirement-age 
population to the working-age population. Thus, we can shed light on the applicability 
of the selfish life-cycle model by investigating whether or not the age structure of the 
population has the expected impact on the saving rate. 
 
The author has used a variety of data sources to investigate the impact of the age 
structure of the population on the saving rate, and in this section, we survey this body of 
work and consider whether or not the findings are consistent with the selfish life-cycle 
model. In subsection 3.1, we discuss papers that make use of cross-section data, while 
in subsection 3.2, we discuss papers that make use of time-series data. 
 
3.1. Evidence based on Cross-Country Data 
 
Horioka (1986, 1989) uses data on the member countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for the 1975-84 period from the 
OECD to analyze the determinants of the private saving rate and finds that the ratio of 
the retirement-age population to the working-age population has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on the private saving rate. 
 
Based on his estimation results, Horioka (1986, 1989) calculates the contribution of each 
factor to the difference between Japan’s private saving rate and the OECD-wide average 
and to the U.S.-Japan saving rate gap (see Table 1). During the 1975-84 time period, 
Japan’s population was the youngest and her retirement-age population to working-age 
population ratio was the lowest among all OECD member countries at the time, and as 
Table 1 shows, this can explain virtually all of the difference between Japan’s private 
saving rate and the OECD-wide average and about half of the U.S.-Japan saving rate 
gap. 
  
Similarly, Horioka and Terada-Hagiwara (2012) use panel data on twelve Asian 
countries for the 1966-2007 period from Penn World Tables to analyze the determinants 
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of the domestic saving rate, and as in the case of Horioka (1986, 1989), they find that 
the ratio of the retirement-age population to the working-age population has a negative 
and statistically significant impact on the domestic saving rate. 
 
Finally, Horioka and Wan (2007) use provincial panel data for the 1995-2004 period 
from a household survey to analyze the determinants of the household saving rate in 
China and find that the impact of the ratio of the retirement-age population to the 
working-age population is negative, as expected, but often not statistically significant. 
 
3.2. Evidence based on Time-Series Data 
 
Horioka (1997) uses time-series data for the 1955-93 period from Japan’s National 
Accounts to analyze the determinants of Japan’s household saving rate and finds that 
there is a cointegrating relationship between the household saving rate and the ratio of 
the retirement-age population to the working-age population and that this ratio has a 
negative and statistically significant impact on the household saving rate. 
 
Figure 2 shows trends over time in National Accounts data on Japan’s household saving 
rate for the 1955-2018 period, and as can be seen from this figure, Japan’s household 
saving rate showed a sharp upward trend from 1955 until the mid-1970s, peaking at 
23.2%, and showed a sharp downward trend thereafter, sometimes even becoming 
negative. 
 
The ratio of the retirement-age population to the working-age population in Japan has 
shown a steady upward trend over time so Horioka’s (1997) finding that this ratio has a 
negative and statistically significant impact on the household saving rate implies that the 
upward trend in this ratio can explain the downward trend in Japan’s household saving 
rate since the mid-1970s and that further increases in this ratio will cause further declines 




In this section, we showed that the ratio of the retirement-age population to the working-
age population has a negative and statistically significant impact on the saving rate 
whether one uses cross-country data or time-series data. This not only suggests that the 
selfish life-cycle model applies in the case of Japan but also that the low ratio of the 
retirement-age population to the working-age population can explain why Japan’s 
household saving rate was so high in the past and that the sharp increase in this ratio can 
explain the sharp decline in Japan’s household saving rate since the mid-1970s. Thus, 
the selfish life-cycle model can explain the level of, as well as trends over time in, 
Japan’s household saving rate. 
 
 
4. Evidence on the Saving Behavior of Retirees 
 
The selfish life-cycle model assumes that working individuals save and that retirees 
dissave. Thus, we can shed light on the applicability of the selfish life-cycle model by 
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examining the saving behavior or retirees. In this section, we survey studies that examine 
the saving behavior of retirees and consider whether or not they are consistent with the 
selfish life-cycle model. 
 
Hayashi, et al. (1988) carefully analyze household-level data from the “National Survey 
of Family Income and Expenditure,” which is conducted every five years by the 
Statistics Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications and 
find that the elderly start dissaving after the age of 80 whether they live in nuclear 
households or extended (three-generation) households. However, Hayashi, et al. (1988) 
do not take account of the employment status of respondents, and if they had confined 
the sample to retired elderly, they are likely to have found that the Japanese elderly start 
dissaving at an earlier age.  
 
Horioka (2006, 2010) and Horioka and Niimi (2017) analyze tabulated data on retired 
elderly from the “Family Income and Expenditure Survey,” which is conducted by the 
Statistic Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, and 
find that the saving rate of such households has fluctuated in the -40 to -10% range and 
that their decumulation rate of financial assets has fluctuated in the 1 to 3% range since 
2000. 1  These findings constitute convincing evidence that Japanese retirees are 
dissaving and strongly suggest that the selfish life-cycle model applies in the case of 




5. Evidence on Saving Motives 
 
The simplest version of the selfish life-cycle model implies that individuals should be 
saving primarily for living expenses during retirement and that they should not be saving 
to leave bequests to their children. Thus, we can shed light on the applicability of the 
selfish life-cycle model by looking at the relative importance of saving for individual 
motives. In this section, we survey studies that attempt to estimate the contribution of 
saving for each motive to total household saving and consider whether or not the findings 
are consistent with the selfish life-cycle model. 
 
Let me first explain the methodology for calculating the amount of saving for each 
motive. If individuals cannot realize a motive with only their current income, they need 
to rely on saving. Moreover, at any given time, there will be individuals who are saving 
in order to prepare for a given motive as well as individuals who are dissaving to realize 
the same motive. For example, at any given time, there will be pre-retirement individuals 
who are saving for retirement as well as post-retirement individuals who are dissaving 
for retirement. Thus, the contribution that saving for a given motive makes to aggregate 
household saving is net saving for that motive, which can be calculated as gross saving 
 
1  Horioka and Niimi (2017) and Niimi and Horioka (2019) point out that the rate of wealth 
decumulation of Japanese retirees is slower than one might expect but show that this can be explained 
by the presence of precautionary saving and bequest motives, especially the former. See Ventura and 
Horioka (2019) for a similar analysis of the determinants of the saving behavior of retirees in Italy. 
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for that motive minus dissaving for that motive. Mathematically,  
 
(10)    NS = net saving for a given motive = GS – DS 
 
where GS = gross saving for a given motive  
       DS = dissaving for a given motive  
 
Furthermore, there are two ways in which one can use saving to help realize a given 
motive. The first way is to rely on one’s own wealth, and in the case of this way, one 
accumulates the financial assets needed to realize the motive in question beforehand and 
draws down those assets in order to realize that motive. The other way is to rely on 
borrowing, and in this case, one borrows the funds needed to realize the motive in 
question, uses those funds to realize that motive, and repays the loan little by little after 
realizing the motive (note that loan repayments (repayment of the principal) are a form 
of saving). What should be noted is that the saving is done before the realization of the 
motive when one relies on one’s own wealth and that it is done after the realization of 
the motive when one relies on borrowing． 
 
The gross saving and dissaving for a given motive in the case of the two financing 
methods are shown in Table 2, and as can be seen from this table, the gross saving for a 
given motive equals the sum of saving in the form of the accumulation of financial assets 
and saving in the form of loan repayments. Similarly, dissaving for a given motive equals 
dissaving in the form of the decumulation of financial assets and dissaving in the form 
of new borrowings. Moreover, as noted earlier, net saving for a given motive equals 
gross saving for that motive minus dissaving for that motive.  
 
In 1996, the former Institute of Posts and Telecommunications Policy of the Japanese 
conducted the “U.S.-Japan Comparison Survey of Saving” simultaneously in the United 
States and Japan, and this survey collected detailed information on saving, dissaving, 
new borrowings, and loan repayments for each motive. Horioka, et al. (1998, 2000) use 
the data from this survey to calculate the contribute of saving for each motive to 
aggregate household saving (see Horioka (1988) and Horioka and Watanabe (1997, 
1998) for a similar analysis using data on Japan from a different source). 
 
Table 3 shows data from Horioka, et al. (1998, 2000) on the contribution of net saving 
for each motive to total household saving. If the selfish life-cycle model applies, 
individuals should be saving primarily for the retirement motive, and as this table shows, 
net saving for the retirement motive accounts for a full 62.23% and 30.84% of total 
household saving in Japan and the United States, respectively, and that it is by far the 
dominant component of household saving in both countries. Thus, the selfish life-cycle 
model seems to apply in both countries. However, the share of retirement-related saving 
in Japan is more than twice what it is in the United States, which suggests that the selfish 
life-cycle model applies to a greater extent in Japan than it does in the United States.2 
  
 
2 The second most important saving motive is the precautionary motive in both countries. 
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If the simplest version of the selfish life-cycle model applies, individuals should not 
leave a bequest to their children and should therefore not be saving in order to leave a 
bequest. As can be seen from Table 3, the share of net saving for the bequest motive is 
1.50% in Japan and 5.04% in the United States, and thus its share is low in both countries 
but especially in Japan. Thus, our findings concerning saving for the bequest motive also 
suggest that the selfish life-cycle model applies in both Japan and the United States but 
that it is especially applicable in the case of Japan.  
 
To summarize, our findings concerning saving motives also suggest that the selfish life-
cycle model applies to a greater extent in Japan than in other countries. 
 
 
6. Evidence on the Prevalence of Bequests 
 
The simplest version of the selfish life-cycle model assumes that individuals do not leave 
any bequests or other intergenerational transfers to their children so we can shed light 
on the applicability of the selfish life-cycle model by looking at the prevalence of 
bequests and other transfers. In this section, we survey the literature on the prevalence 
of bequests and other transfers and consider whether or not the findings are consistent 
with the selfish life-cycle model. 
 
The most commonly used measure of the importance of bequests and other 
intergenerational transfers is the share of such transfers in total household wealth. This 
measure was first used by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), and they obtain the shocking 
result that the share of intergenerational transfers in total household wealth amounts to 
a full 46 to 81 percent. Subsequently, many researchers have calculated this share using 
a variety of methodology and data sources for a large number of countries. Davies and 
Shorrocks (2000) survey this literature and conclude that the majority of studies find 
that this share is 35 to 45% in the United States, roughly comparable to the United States 
in Canada, and somewhat higher in France.  
 
Moreover, a number of researchers have tried to calculate the share of intergenerational 
transfers in total household wealth for the case of Japan. For example, Hayashi (1986) 
estimates this share to be at least 9%, Dekle (1989) estimates it to be 3-49%, Barthold 
and Ito (1992) estimate it to be at most 25-40%, Campbell (1997) estimates it to be 23-
28%, and Horioka (2008b,c and 2009) estimates it to be 15-18%. Thus, this share 
appears to be lower in Japan than it is in the United States and other countries, which 
suggests that bequests and other intergenerational transfers are less important 
quantitatively in Japan than they are in other countries. Thus, the findings concerning 
the quantitative importance of bequests also suggest that the selfish life-cycle model 
applies to a greater extent in Japan than in other countries. 
 
Another approach for gauging the importance of bequests and other intergenerational 
transfers is to look not at the amounts of bequests actually left but to ask individuals 
about their bequest intentions. Osaka University has been conducting a household survey 
called the “Preference Parameters Study” in four countries (China, India, Japan, and the 
United States) since 2003, and fortunately, this survey contains several questions about 
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bequests. The bequest data from this survey are analyzed in detail in Horioka (2014a,b), 
and as can be seen from these papers, the proportion of respondents planning to leave a 
bequest to their children is by far the highest in India (87.05%), also relatively high in 
the United States (60.77%) and China (56.35%), and by far the lowest in Japan (31.44%). 
These findings reinforce our earlier conclusion that bequests are less prevalent in Japan 
than in other countries and that the selfish life-cycle model applies to a greater extent in 
Japan than in other countries. 
    
 
7. Evidence on Bequest Motives 
 
In the previous section, we presented our findings concerning the prevalence of bequests 
and other intergenerational transfers and concluded that they are less prevalent in Japan 
than in other countries. However, even if the selfish life-cycle model applies, individuals 
may still leave bequests and other transfers, and thus, even if we find that individuals do 
leave bequests and other transfers, we cannot make a determination about the 
applicability of the selfish life-cycle model unless we know the reasons for which 
individuals leave bequests and other transfers. Thus, in this section, we present evidence 
on the motives for which individuals leave bequests and other transfers and consider 
whether or not the findings are consistent with the selfish life-cycle model. 
 
If individuals are selfish, as assumed by the life-cycle model, they should either leave 
no bequests at all, leave only accidental or unintentional bequests arising from lifespan 
uncertainty, or selfish motivated bequests. One example of selfishly motivated bequests 
is the strategic (or exchange) bequest motive proposed by Bernheim, Shleifer, and 
Summers (1985), according to which parents leave a bequest to their children to induce 
them to provide care, attention, and/or financial assistance during old age. By contrast, 
altruistic parents will leave a bequest to their children unconditionally (i.e., whether or 
not their children provide anything in return) (see Arrondel and Masson (2006) and 
Laferrère and Wolff (2006)). Thus, we can shed light on the applicability of the selfish 
life-cycle model by looking at data on bequest motives. 
 
The “Preference Parameters Study” of Osaka University that we referred to in the 
previous section collects information on bequest motives in four countries (China, India, 
Japan, and the United States). The survey asks “How do you feel about leaving an 
inheritance to your children?” and respondents are asked to select one of eight options. 
Two of the eight options (“I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) no matter what” 
and “I do not plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances 
because doing so may reduce their will to work”) are altruistic, while four (“I plan to 
leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide care (including nursing care) 
during old age,” “I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide 
financial assistance during old age,” “I do not plan to make special efforts to leave an 
inheritance to my child(ren) but will leave whatever is left over,” and “I do not plan to 
leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances because I want to use my 
wealth myself”) are selfish.   
 
Horioka (2014a,b) presents data on bequest motives from this survey for China, India, 
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Japan, and the United States, and as can be seen from these papers, the proportion of 
respondents with an altruistic bequest motive is highest in India (75.80%) and also very 
high in the United States (66.97%), whereas this proportion is lowest in Japan (33.98%) 
and also relatively low in China (37.40%). By contrast, the proportion of respondents 
with a selfish bequest motive is highest in Japan (64.96%) and also relatively high in 
China (55.10%), whereas this proportion of lowest in India (21.82%) and also relatively 
low in the United States (32.76%). Thus, judging from the evidence on bequest motives, 
the Japanese are the most selfish among the four peoples and the Chinese are the next 
most selfish, whereas Indians are the most altruistic and Americans are the next most 
altruistic.3  
 
Moreover, as the data presented in Horioka (2014a) show, data on bequest division point 
to the same conclusion (i.e., that the Japanese are the most selfish and the Chinese the 
second most selfish). However, in the case of bequest division, Americans and Indians 
change positions, with Americans being the most altruistic and Indians being the second 
most altruistic.   
 
Thus, not only do the Japanese leave fewer bequests than other peoples but their bequests 
are more selfishly motivated that those of other peoples. These findings strongly suggest 
that the selfish life cycle model applies to a greater extent in Japan than in other countries.  
 
 
8. Evidence from Tests of Altruism 
 
The simplest version of the selfish life-cycle model assumes that individuals are selfish, 
not altruistic, so we can shed light on the applicability of this model by conducting tests 
of altruism. Thus, in this section, we survey papers that have conducted tests of altruism 
and consider whether or not their findings are consistent with the selfish life-cycle model. 
 
First, we survey the literature that examines the impact of parental bequest motives on 
the behavior of children. If children are altruistic, they should provide care, attention, 
and financial assistance to their parents regardless of whether or not they expect to 
receive bequests from their parents. Conversely, if children are selfish, they should 
provide care, attention, and financial assistance to their children only if they expect to 
receive bequests from their parents (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers’s (1985) strategic 
bequest motive).  
 
(1) Ohtake and Horioka (1994) find that the housing assets of parents have a 
positive and statistically significant impact on the probability that their 
children live with them, and the financial net worth of parents has a positive 
and statistically significant impact on the amount of the financial assistance 
children provide to their parents. 
 
(2) Komamura (1994) finds that the housing assets of parents have a positive and 
 
3 See Horioka, et al., (1998), Horioka, et al. (2000), Horioka (2002a,b), Horioka (2008b,c), and 
Horioka (2009) for similar data from other surveys. 
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statistically significant impact on the probability that their children live with 
them. 
 
(3) Yamada (2006) finds that whether or not children expect to inherit a house 
from their parents has a positive and statistically significant impact on the 
probability that their children live with them and on the frequency with which 
their children contact them and a negative and statistically significant impact 
on the distance between their own home and their children’s home. 
 
(4) Wakabayashi and Horioka (2009) find that whether or not parents are 
managers or homeowners has a positive and statistically significant impact on 
the probability that their children live with them. 
 
(5) Kohara and Ohtake (2011) find that the educational attainment of parents has 
a positive and statistically significant impact on the probability that their 
children take care of them during old age.  
 
(6) Horioka, et al. (2018) find that whether or not children expect to receive a 
bequest from their parents has a positive and statistically significant impact on 
the probability that they live with or near their parents and on the probability 
that they help their parents with housework.  
 
If parental assets, homeownership, occupation, and educational attainment are regarded 
as proxies for expected bequests from parents, all of the aforementioned findings suggest 
that the probability receiving bequests from parents and/or the expected amount of such 
bequests have a positive and statistically significant impact on the probability of parents 
living with, or near, their children and on the probability of receiving care, attention, 
and/or financial assistance from their children. This in turn suggests that the Japanese 
are selfish, not altruistic.  
 
Laferrère and Wolff (2006) survey the literature from throughout the world on the impact 
of parental bequests on children’s behavior. They find that such research is the most 
prevalent in the United States and that two-thirds of such studies for the United States 
suggest that Americans are altruistic (see also Horioka (2014a)). Thus, our findings in 
this section are consistent with our earlier conclusion in section 7 that the Japanese are 
more selfish than Americans. 
 
Moreover, Hayashi (1995) conducts a completely different test of altruism using 
Japanese data. If parents and children are both altruistic, the two sides should pool their 
incomes when deciding how much to consume, and thus if one controls for the combined 
income of parents and children, parental income or children’s income should not have 
any impact on total consumption. However, Hayashi (1995) finds, even after controlling 
for combined income by introducing fixed effects, that parental income and children’s 
income have a statistically significant impact on total consumption. This suggests that 




Thus, tests of altruism suggest that Japanese individuals are selfish, not altruistic, and 
that the selfish life-cycle model applies in the case of Japan. 
 
 
9. Evidence on the Importance of Borrowing (Liquidity) Constraints 
 
In our brief exposition of the selfish life-cycle model in section 2, we assumed that 
individuals smooth their consumption over their lifetimes, but this result requires that 
capital markets are perfect and that borrowing (liquidity) constraints do not exist. Thus, 
we can shed light on the applicability of the selfish life-cycle model by looking at how 
important borrowing (liquidity) constraints are in the real world. In this section, we 
survey the literature on the importance of borrowing (liquidity) constraints in Japan and 
consider whether or not the findings are consistent with the selfish life-cycle model. 
 
Hayashi (1985) and Watanabe, Watanabe, and Watanabe (2001) find that about 15% and 
25% of Japanese households face borrowing (liquidity) constraints, respectively. 
Similarly, Kohara and Horioka (2006) find that 8 to 15% of young Japanese couples are 
borrowing (liquidity) constrained. Thus, all previous studies suggest most Japanese 
households are not borrowing (liquidity) constrained and that the selfish life-cycle model 
applies in the case of Japan.4 
 
Moreover, Horioka (2012a, b) and Horioka and Niimi (2020) find that the ratio of 
household liabilities to household disposable income in Japan was the highest among 
the Group of Seven (G7) countries until at least 2005  
 
All of these findings suggest that borrowing (liquidity) constraints are not so important 
in Japan and provide further evidence that the selfish life-cycle model applies in the case 
of Japan.  
 
 
10. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
In this paper, we first provided a brief exposition of the simplest version of the selfish 
life cycle model or hypothesis, which is undoubtedly the most widely used theoretical 
model of household behavior in economics, and then surveyed the literature on 
household saving behavior in Japan (with emphasis on the author’s own past research) 
to shed light on whether or not the selfish life-cycle model applies in the case of Japan. 
In particular, we surveyed the literature on the impact of the age structure of the 
population on the saving rate, the saving behavior of retired households, saving motives,  
the prevalence of bequests, bequest motives, tests of altruism, and the importance of 
borrowing (liquidity) constraints and show that almost all of the available evidence 
suggests that the selfish life-cycle model applies to a greater extent in Japan than it does 
in other countries. Thus, the answer to the question posed in the title of this paper is an 
 
4 However, Ogawa (2007) finds that the proportion of households facing borrowing (liquidity) 





Needless to say, selfish behavior and altruistic behavior coexist in all countries, and 
Japan is no exception. Fumio Hayashi, the foremost authority on Japanese saving 
behavior, concludes his survey paper on this topic as follows (Hayashi (1997a), p. 322): 
 
“We can now profitably contemplate what sort of model is best suited for explaining 
these stylized facts [about Japanese household saving behavior]. It has become clear that 
intergenerational linkages through the exchange of nonmarket services and through 
altruism will be an essential ingredient.” 
 
Moreover, Hayashi makes the following assertion elsewhere in the same paper 
(Hayashi(1997a), p. 319): “[b]oth the exchange and altruistic motives are important for 
explaining [Japanese household saving behavior].” 
 
The current author agrees completely with Hayashi but strongly feels that selfish 
behavior is more prevalent in Japan than altruistic behavior and that the selfish life-cycle 
model applies to a considerable extent in the case of Japan.  
 
Some readers may be surprised to learn that the selfish life-cycle model applies to a 
greater extent in Japan than in the United States and other countries because Japan is a 
non-Western country with very different traditions, social norms, and institutions and 
closer family ties. However, it must be borne in mind that the fact that family ties are 
close does not necessarily imply that family members harbor feelings of altruism toward 
one another. It could be that family ties are more extensive than in other countries but 
that they are motivated by strategic rather than altruistic considerations (see Horioka 
(2019) for a more extensive discussion of the impact of culture on the saving and bequest 
behavior of the Japanese). 
 
Finally, I would like to consider the policy implication of my finding that the selfish life-
cycle model applies in the case of Japan. This conclusion has at least five important 
implications:  
 
(1) When constructing theoretical models to describe Japanese household 
behavior, one should construct models that assume that households are selfish 
rather than altruistic or models that assume that selfish households and 
altruistic households coexist. 
 
(2) As population aging progresses even further in Japan, Japan’s household 
saving rate can be expected to decline ever further. This is likely to lead to 
substantial capital shortages, which in turn may necessitate fiscal 
reconstruction measures designed to reduce the large deficits (negative saving) 
of the government sector. 
 
(3) Ricardian equivalence does not apply in the case of Japan, meaning that the 
Japanese Government will be able to stimulate the economy by implementing 




(4) Our finding that bequests are motivated primarily by strategic or exchange 
considerations in Japan implies that they are accompanied by some sort of quid 
pro quo such as care, attention, and financial assistance during old age. This, 
in turn, implies that bequests in Japan will be largely offset by transfers in the 
opposite direction (from children to parents), meaning that net transfers from 
parents to children will not necessarily be large or even positive and that 
wealth disparities will not necessarily be transmitted from generation to 
generation (from parents to children).5 
 
(5) Our finding that bequests are motivated primarily by strategic or exchange 
considerations in Japan implies that the introduction of a public long-term care 
insurance system in 2000 may lead to a reduction in the prevalence of bequests 
because parents will no longer need to rely on their children for care during 
old age to the same extent as in the past.  
 
Thus, whether or not the selfish life-cycle model applies in the case of Japan is important 
not only from an intellectual perspective but also from a policy perspective, and thus 
further work on this topic is of urgent need. I am therefore planning to continue my 
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5 However, Niimi and Horioka (2018) find that individuals receiving bequests are more likely to 
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Figure 1: The Selfish Life-Cycle Model
                      Y
Cumulative saving during working years













The contribution of a high income growth rate +0.45 +0.47
The contribution of a low retirement-age population ratio +5.45 +6.90
The contribution of a low dependent-age population ratio +1.64 +1.07
The contribution of a high labor force participation rate of the
elderly
-3.94 -3.89
The contribution of a low per capita income level +4.36 +1.29
Subtotal +7.96 +5.85
Unexplained residual +2.90 +0.95
Total private saving rate gap +10.86 +6.80
Table 1: A Decomposition of the Private Saving Rate Gap between Japan and Other
Countries
Source: Horioka (1986, 1989)








Figure 2: Trends over Time in Japan’s Household Saving Rate, 1955-2018 
 
 
Note: This figure shows trends over time in the household saving rate, which is  
     defined as household saving as a share of household disposable income (in 
percent). 
Source: Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Government of  
Japan, “Annual Report on National Accounts,” various issues. 
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Saving Motive Japan U.S.
Retirement 62.23 30.84
Precautionary 41.18 27.93
Children's education 8.77 -0.14
Children's marriage 7.31 2.87
Housing purchase -15.57 14.60
Consumer durable purchases 1.54 4.20
Leisure 2.44 6.35
Payment of taxes 0.25 6.40




Table 3: A U.S.-Japan Comparison of the Share of Net Saving
for Each Motive
Note: The figures denote the share of net saving for each motive in
total household saving (in percent).
Source: Horioka, et al. (1998) and Horioka, et al. (2000).  
